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Introduction
1
 
The post-Maastricht re-launch of the European Union (EU)’s international relations, the 2004-
7 enlargement and the subsequent redrawing of its external borders, brought the EU closer to 
a range of conflicts and a rather awkward type of states: self-declared states, which are not 
recognised by a significant part of the international community. Indeed, the majority of 
conflicts in the EU’s near abroad relate to such contested states, like Kosovo, Palestine, the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Transnistria and 
Nagorno-Karabakh in the post-Soviet space or more recently separatism in Donetsk and 
Luhansk in Ukraine. Further away, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 
Western Sahara, Somaliland and Taiwan are also invariably important for the international 
role of the EU, while the possibility of an independent but unrecognised Kurdistan shows the 
ongoing significance of contested statehood in international politics.  
Although the literature has tried to conceptualise the EU’s conflict resolution role (e.g. Diez et 
al. 2008; Tocci 2007, Whitman and Wolff 2012), the issue of contested statehood and its 
implications for EU engagement remain under-researched. While some works on contested 
states have touched upon the so-called ‘engagement without recognition’ (e.g. Cooley and 
Mitchell 2010, Caspersen 2015, Ker-Lindsay 2015), EU studies have mainly focused on the 
impact of integration on the state from which the contested state attempts secession (e.g. 
Coppieters et al. 2004; Diez et al. 2008), how domestic actors of contested states understand 
the EU (e.g. Popescu 2007; Vahl and Emerson 2004), diplomatic issues (e.g. Papadimitriou 
and Petrov 2012) or the EU’s efforts for state-building but without taking into account 
contested statehood (eg. Bieber 2011; Börzel 2011; Bouris 2014).  In this regard, this article 
addresses this gap in the literature by offering a comparison of the TRNC and Palestine in 
order to answer the following central research question: how do different parameters of 
contested statehood mediate the impact of the EU on contested states?  
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The article focuses on contested states as those entities that have declared independence, but 
are not recognised by a significant part of the international community, and which also 
display at least some degree of what are conventionally understood as statehood 
characteristics: a certain population, a territory, a government and capacity to enter into 
relations with third states (see also Geldenhuys 2009). Conceptually, the article draws upon 
debates on Europeanisation and sovereignty, the combination of which helps to account for 
how the impact of the EU is mediated by a set of parameters in contested states, namely lack 
of international recognition, effective government and territorial control. Policy documents, 
official statements and a series of semi-structured interviews with EU officials and local elites 
involved with EU policies in Brussels, Nicosia, Jerusalem and Ramallah are analysed 
qualitatively. These interviews, dating back to crucial eras of EU involvement, help to 
triangulate the rest of material collected and provide the reader with new empirical insights. 
They also support the key argument of this study which is that the role and impact of the EU 
are compromised either because the lack of international recognition does not allow the 
development of meaningful relations and/or because the lack of territorial control 
obstructs/limits the EU’s ability to apply its policies on the ground. Yet we also find certain 
opportunities for the EU, namely that ineffective government allows the promotion of state-
building, while non-recognition encourages the empowerment of civil society and/or greater 
international integration.  
 
As such, the contribution of this article is two-fold. First, it introduces an innovative 
framework that draws upon both international relations and European studies to offer a 
systematic conceptualisation of the Europeanisation of contested states, which, although 
highly important and topical, remains relatively under-researched. While not exploring in-
depth the relationship between Europeanisation process and the conflict trajectory, our 
analysis raises a range of questions on this and aims to offer a blueprint for further research 
on the links between contested statehood, international engagement and conflict resolution. 
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Secondly, the article offers a rich empirical account of the EU’s role in two prominent 
contested states. The article is structured as follows. The next section reflects on the 
conceptual framework and research design and it is followed by a section that focuses on the 
two case studies and, finally, a section offering comparative insights and avenues for further 
research.  
 
Europeanisation and the different faces of sovereignty 
In exploring the EU’s involvement and impact on contested states this article engages with the 
Europeanisation literature, which has focused on EU-induced changes in national policy, 
institutions and politics (Börzel 1999; Ladrech 1994; Töller 2010; Wallace 2000). Having 
started as a debate regarding the impact of the EU on member states, Europeanisation scholars 
have also discussed the EU’s role vis-à-vis candidates for accession (Glenn 2004; Grabbe 
2001; Sedelmeier 2011) or third states (Lavenex and Uҫarer 2004, 419; Schimmelfennig 
2009, 8; Wallace 2000, 371). Europeanisation is seen as a process of structural change that 
affects actors, institutions, interests, practices and ideas (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003) and 
comes as a response to EU policies and decisions. In terms of how this process of 
Europeanisation takes place, the literature points to three mechanisms, which guide the 
conceptual analysis of our empirical findings. First, Europeanisation can be a result of 
compliance with institutional or policy directions. Earlier europeanisation works focused on 
institutional compliance as a result of EU law implementation for existing (e.g. Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002) or candidate EU member states (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). 
However, pressures for institutional compliance can also be exerted upon third states not as a 
result of legal pressures to implement the acquis but because this is the only way for these 
countries to further their relation to the EU- this becomes relevant to this study, which focuses 
on cases outside the EU. In this context, studies have also looked at how neighbours of the 
EU might comply with certain EU standards (Lavenex 2008, Schimmelfennig 2009). 
Secondly, drawing on rational choice institutionalism, Europeanisation studies have also 
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focused on changes to domestic opportunity structures, i.e. distribution of power (Börzel and 
Risse 2000). Lastly, sociological institutionalism reflects on the socialisation of actors into 
certain practices (Börzel and Risse 2000; Schmidt 2001, 6) and how the EU can change 
domestic beliefs and expectations, styles, practices and ‘ways of doing things’ (Radaelli 2000, 
44).  
 
Because of the focus on contested states, this article considers state institutions as the starting 
point of analysis, although we find broader implications for the areas of civil society and 
political elites that are important to note vis-a-vis institutional changes. In this regard, we 
adopt a two-level analysis, discussing the engagement of the EU in contested states but 
focusing mainly on the impact of this engagement, which is central to the discussion of 
Europeanisation. A recurring theme within this debate has been how Europeanisation is 
mediated by national parameters, including a ‘misfit’ between what exists at the domestic 
level and the reforms promoted by the EU (Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2000; 
Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). It is this focus on how different national parameters mediate 
the impact of the EU that also makes Europeanisation a useful tool in understanding the EU’s 
engagement in contested states, and the implications that their unique characteristics have for 
this. This has been explored before (see Kyris 2013; 2015) but the contribution of this article 
is that we further this Europeanisation discussion by combining it more explicitly and 
systematically with the concept of sovereignty, which helps identifying lack of international 
recognition, territorial control and effective government as certain parameters of contested 
statehood and explore how they might mediate EU impact. We turn to the discussion on 
sovereignty, because of how central it is in the way states, contested or not, are approached 
both by scholars but also international actors, like the EU. 
 
While the ways in which it informs practice in world politics have changed over the years (see 
Jackson 2007), the idea of sovereignty remains relatively stable and central to how we 
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understand statehood. In a seminal conceptualisation of statehood, Krasner (2001) 
distinguishes between: external (also referred to as negative – see Jackson 1993) sovereignty 
and internal (or positive) sovereignty. While external sovereignty refers to the recognition of a 
state from outsiders in the international system, internal sovereignty refers to effective state 
structures and authority – what is often described as empirical statehood.  
 
It follows from this that what is seen as the sine qua non characteristic of contested statehood 
is the lack of external sovereignty – that is, the fact that these entities are not recognised as 
states by a significant part of the international community. Often resulting in extensive 
international isolation, the lack of statehood recognition should not be confused with the 
recognition of the right to statehood – what Geldenhuys (2009) calls ‘titular’ recognition. 
Many works on contested states have engaged with the concept of sovereignty (e.g. Caspersen 
2012; Caspersen and Stansfield 2011) and it is important to underline here that there exist 
many forms of interaction, such as trade, air and postal communication (Berg and Toomla 
2009) or membership of international organisations (Ker-Lindsay 2012; 2015), which, 
although not constituting external sovereignty per se, might add to sovereignty claims on 
behalf of contested states. Applying those ideas to understand contested states, we suggest 
that there is high external sovereignty where there is recognition by more than two thirds of 
UN member states and low external sovereignty where less than a third of UN members 
recognise, with the rest of contested states enjoying medium external sovereignty. This 
approach should be combined with a more qualitative analysis, which also accounts for titular 
recognition. As a result, we consider TRNC as having low external sovereignty, because it is 
only recognised by Turkey, while Palestine is considered to have high external sovereignty, 
because it is recognised by more than two thirds of UN members and it also enjoys 
widespread titular recognition.  
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Contested states should also be conceptualised as demonstrating some lack of internal 
sovereignty – that is de facto effective control of the government of the state over its territory 
and people and, generally, effective economic and political systems and institutions (Clapham 
1998, Krasner 2004). While this issue has been extensively discussed with reference to 
‘weak’, ‘quasi’ or ‘failed’ states (Jackson 1993; Migdal 1988), we argue that it gains 
increased importance in cases of contested states. Often, territorial disputes and/or secession 
efforts come with lack of control of the contested state government over its self-proclaimed 
territories. This is because the parent or reference state
2
 might be able to exercise control over 
those areas, such as in the case of Palestine. In 1993, the Oslo Accords created the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), tasked to control a number of non-contiguous population centres. With Oslo 
II, the West Bank was divided into three areas: it was only in Area A (17.7 per cent) that the 
PA was given full administrative and security control. In Area B (21.3 per cent), the PA was 
given civil control while Israel maintained security control. In Area C (61 per cent), Israel 
would retain full responsibility and control. 
 
But internal sovereignty also relates to the presence of effective governments and the 
relatively young character of many of the existing contested states (eight out of twelve 
declared independence after 1983), coupled with the lack of international integration, might 
also result in weak state apparatuses. Palestine for example, can be considered as having 
compromised internal sovereignty also in this respect. Linked to the fact that the state 
formation process only started in 1993 (before this the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under 
full Israeli Civil Administration Control) Palestine should be considered as having low 
internal sovereignty by the time the EU embarked on engagement. TRNC, on the other hand, 
can be considered as displaying high internal sovereignty. This is because TRNC a stable 
political and economic system, including a centralised and effective government, public 
administration, a multi-party political system and a working economy but also effective 
control of the territories they claim (northern Cyprus). Turkish Cypriot dependency on Turkey 
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for performing certain state functions (e.g. reliance on Turkish military for security) is crucial 
but this is not to undermine their overall internal sovereignty and as such it is not at the focus 
of our discussion here. Interestingly, these two faces of sovereignty seem to be interrelated. 
For example, Caspersen (2015) has looked at strategies of ‘earned sovereignty’ and how 
contested states might seek to adopt values promoted by the international community with the 
hope to increase their external sovereignty, a strategy which can eventually reinforce what is 
understood as internal sovereignty.
3
  
 
In this regard, a series of questions are raised as to whether processes of Europeanisation are 
mediated by different degrees of external and internal sovereignty. Existing literature on 
international engagement highlights certain problems that mostly relate to external 
sovereignty issues, particularly the fact that engagement is difficult because it is seen as 
recognition by implication, a problem that becomes especially acute where there is a parent 
state whose territorial integrity is prioritised and which is keen to veto engagement (see for 
example Herrberg 2010, Ker-Lindsay 2012). The literature has, therefore, found a ‘reluctant’ 
engagement (Caspersen 2008) - but engagement nevertheless -, which amongst else focuses 
on involving local leadership and civil society, especially moderates and in peace processes 
(Berg and Pegg 2016). In this regard, our analysis aims to discuss the different obstacles but 
also opportunities thus also adding directly to the literature on ‘engagement’.  Our study of 
the TRNC, which is heavily unrecognised, will seek to add to those analyses by moving away 
from discussion of broader engagement from the side of the international community and 
exploring EU engagement in specific and in more depth. What is more, by combining insights 
from the discussion on contested states and Europeanisation, this article also contributes to the 
literature by exploring not only the EU’s engagement per se but also its impact on the ground, 
and how it is mediated by parameters that relate more to internal sovereignty, i.e. state 
structures and territorial control. The focus on those internal characteristics of unrecognised 
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states, tested in our case study of Palestine, is yet another way in which this article adds to the 
literature, which has been dominated by more external issues of international recognition.  
To this end, our analysis draws on the conceptual discussion of sovereignty to account for 
how the lack of a) international recognition and b) territorial control and effective government 
(independent variables) mediate the engagement and impact of the EU (dependent variable) 
on TRNC and Palestine respectively, which is posited to unravel via policy or institutional 
compliance, redistribution of power and/or changes in ideas and practices (casual 
mechanisms) offered by the Europeanisation literature. We look at the EU impact that has 
been shaped by parameters of contested statehood rather than EU-induced changes more 
generally. To ensure causality, we also focus exclusively on EU policies (rather than other 
processes, such as engagement from different international organisations, see also 
Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 2016). We explore our research question and test our 
independent variables (a) and (b) in the two cases of the TRNC and Palestine separately and 
then we compare our findings. This is done because, although Palestine and TRNC are both 
contested states, they differ significantly when we look closer at the characteristics of 
contested statehood with regard to the independent variable of this study: while TRNC lacks 
predominantly international recognition (independent variable a), Palestine has a greater 
deficit of territorial control and effective government (independent variable b). As a result, 
this variation with high and low values of the independent variable (high external sovereignty 
and low internal sovereignty in the TRNC, vice versa in Palestine) is especially conductive to 
heuristic case studies like these and allows us to uncover differences in the dependent variable 
and the casual mechanisms (George and Bennet 2005). What is more, the choice of these two 
cases is also important for illustrating two more, related points often found in the literature: 
first, that sovereignty can have different degrees and should not be seen as absolute (see also 
Caplan 2006, 12). Second, that different degrees of internal and external sovereignty might 
co-exist. The small number of cases will allow to in-depth explore the process of 
Europeanisation rather than simply its occurrence (Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 2016, 344-
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346, see also Van Era 1997, 55 on cases studies). By doing so, we contend that our findings 
are an important starting point for exploring process of Europeanisation in the variety of 
contested states that exist today.  
 
The EU in the TRNC 
The failure of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus (RoC) established in 1960 led to conflict 
and the gradual territorial and administrative division of the island into two zones: the RoC is 
now monopolised by the Greek Cypriots in the south of the island, while in 1983 Turkish 
Cypriots officially self-declared their secessionist TRNC. Since then, the TRNC has had 
effective control of northern Cyprus, but is only recognised by Turkey. Conversely, RoC 
continues to be recognised as the only legitimate government of the country. So far, efforts to 
resolve the Cyprus conflict based on a federal reunification have failed. Following accession 
of Cyprus, the engagement of the EU with the Turkish Cypriots has had both practical and 
political reasons: officially, the whole of the island is an EU territory but, in practice, northern 
Cyprus remains an area that the government of the RoC cannot control. For that reason, EU 
law is suspended in the north (Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty). Yet the persisting 
potential for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict based on reunification means that the EU 
needs to prepare northern Cyprus for its full European integration, when a federation would 
replace the RoC as a member state. In this regard, the EU has tried to increase the chances of 
a successful resolution mostly by means of the Financial Aid Regulation (FAR) (Council of 
the European Union 2006), which aims to assist development and preparation for EU law 
implementation, and the Green Line Regulation (GLR) (Council of the European 2005b), 
which facilitates trade between the two communities.  
 
From the beginning, contested statehood and the low degree of external sovereignty put 
hermetic barriers against EU engagement and impact in northern Cyprus. The Commission’s 
plan for a preferential trade agreement between the EU and northern Cyprus was never 
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implemented, largely because the Greek Cypriot-led RoC asserted that implementation would 
imply recognition of the TRNC. But lack of recognition has impacted even those instruments 
that have been adopted for northern Cyprus
4
 and has shaped the effect of the EU on the 
ground, often undermining the success of EU initiatives (TAIEX 2009, 18). For example, 
because TRNC is not recognised, the Commission cannot use financial agreements with the 
local government as the legal basis for the aid provided. Instead, the EU had to respond with a 
more direct engagement, which tested its resources (European Court of Auditors 2012, 2). 
 
In an effort to overcome the conundrum of dealing with an unrecognised state, some novel 
institutional solutions were introduced. While the government of the contested state enjoys an 
important role in the interaction with the EU and was required to make adjustments in this 
regard (in a similar fashion to third states or candidates for accession - for more on 
institutional changes see Kyris 2015), the low degree of external sovereignty is responsible 
for the extensive role of local technocrats and civil society in managing EU affairs. For 
example, the highly technocratic EU Coordination Centre was established by the Turkish 
Cypriots in order to save Brussels from the risk of ‘recognition by implication’.5 Similarly, 
the EU has also opted for dealings with civil society. An interesting example here is the role 
that the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) has gained in the GLR. The 
implementation of the regulation called for a series of trade tasks, such as the issue of trade 
documents and monitoring of trade, usually given to national ministries.
6
 In this instance, 
however, the EU preferred to avoid formal interactions with public institutions and delegated 
these responsibilities to the KTTO (European Commission 2004), which in this way gained an 
unpredictably important influence over certain policies. Because of this, the KTTO 
established a strong lobbying office in Brussels, operating beyond the scope of the GLR 
strictly speaking. The KTTO is only one example of how the lack of external sovereignty has 
mediated the process of Europeanisation in the form of changing domestic power distribution 
(Europeanisation mechanism 2) towards an empowered civil society as an alternative 
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interlocutor with Brussels. Indeed, members of the European Parliament Group for the 
Turkish Cypriots also discuss how they tend to engage more with civil society, as a result of 
the non-recognition of the self-declared state.
7
. To this end and while the process of European 
integration has tended to favour national executives, in the contested TRNC the executive has 
an important role in dealings with the EU – but so do non-state actors, like civil society or 
technocrats, who therefore enjoy policy knowledge and influence and better access to the 
international and EU environment. 
 
Besides, the overall objective of the FAR is to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by 
encouraging Turkish Cypriot development, alignment with EU law and more contacts with 
the Greek Cypriots (Council of the European Union 2006, 1.1). Towards these aims, the EU 
has provided financial assistance and expert seminars on issues such as preparation for legal 
approximation with EU law or training on the principles of effective transposition of legal 
texts (TAIEX 2009, 18) and, generally, has facilitated the exchange of best practises and 
techniques (TAIEX 2004, 12; TAIEX 2005, 10). Here, the low degree of external sovereignty 
seems conducive to EU-induced reform of policy and administrative structures: because of the 
limited recognition, there is an important international isolation that comes with often 
outdated
8
 institutions and the misfit between Turkish Cypriot policies, practices and 
procedures and what EU integration calls for.
9
 This leaves space for significant 
Europeanisation pressures to be exerted. However, because it is unclear if and when the island 
will reunify (which would make EU law applicable also in northern Cyprus), there are no 
strong institutional compliance pressures (mechanism number 1), neither does the EU 
prescribe very explicit institutional models. Instead, changes that occur, can be better 
understood as an outcome of the socialisation of Turkish Cypriot elites with EU actors, such 
as in the context of TAIEX, whose activities have anyway focused on the transformation of 
local mentality with regard to its adjustment to EU policies and practices
10
. Positive 
assessment from the side of the EU with regard to progress in a number of areas (e.g. 
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environment, financial services- see TAIEX 2007, 10; TAIEX 2008, 20) as well as the 
approval of a range of new laws (e.g. competition law, work health and safety) as a result of 
the FAR suggest a process of Europeanisation through changes to practises and ‘ways of 
doing things’ (mechanism number 3), yet, a far greater potential for change seems to be 
unrealised. This is because the EU cannot work as easily with authorities of the contested 
state (Court of Auditors 2015, 12) as well as because of the unclear prospects of reunification 
and application of EU law in northern Cyprus.  
 
Similarly, the low degree of external sovereignty and the underdevelopment that has been 
caused also by the non-recognition and isolation of the Turkish Cypriots have also shaped the 
way the EU has tried to assist socio-economic development. In an effort to boost 
infrastructure, the EU has funded a projects on waste management, traffic safety and energy 
matters (European Court of Auditors 2012, 5). The EU has also targeted development through 
grant schemes like Improving Agricultural Production. Other programmes have aimed at 
technical assistance and capacity-building, also through the inclusion of locals in EU-level 
processes. At the same time, the Commission also underlines problems that stem from 
international isolation and underdevelopment, such as an extraordinary demand for 
supervision or the beneficiaries’ lack of experience of claiming and managing EU grants 
(European Court of Auditors 2012, 5). These problems can be considered as compromising 
the overall impact that the EU could achieve by fulfilling objectives of the regulation. 
 
Within development assistance, capacity-building of local civil society has been identified as 
a specific priority of the EU (Civil Society Support Team 2009). Through the Cypriot Civil 
Society in Action programmes, the EU has sought to help locals, also in the context of 
reconciliation with the Greek Cypriots. Technical help seems to have been particularly 
important for the Turkish Cypriots. For example, because projects of other donors (e.g. UN) 
have traditionally been supervised by externals, the EU made an extra effort to increase 
 13 
capacity of the NGOs to maintain ownership of their activities.
11
 These efforts are important 
for the Europeanisation via change of practices and ideas (mechanism number 3) of those 
actors involved towards strengthening their internal organisation capacities and staff skills 
(Business and Strategies European Consortium 2013, 34). By doing so, the EU’s assistance 
has also empowered local civil society (see Europeanisation mechanism number 2) and, in 
some instances, has allowed them to exit constrains of the domestic arena (Goetz and Hix 
2001, 12) to pursue their objectives. For example, the EU has funded the bi-communal 
initiative Cyprus Island-Wide NGO Development Platform (CYINDEP), which now 
participates in international platforms (Civicus 2011). More locally, environmental 
organisations were invited to consult the government in the preparation of legislation aligned 
to EU law.
12
 In this sense, the EU has often opened new avenues for influencing politics. This 
is particularly crucial because influencing domestic affairs has been rather challenging 
(INTRAC 2011; Business and Strategies European Consortium 2013, 34). Despite those small 
positive steps, there is still a long way to go and the long-term sustainability of a powerful 
civil society is questionable (European Court of Auditors 2012, 23), particularly because the 
Turkish Cypriot political and legal system is not conducive.
13
 
 
Last, but not least, the FAR also aims at bringing locals ‘closer to the EU’ (Council of the 
European Union 2006, Article 2) via specific instruments, the rationale of which is closely 
related to the issue of contested statehood: 
 
From [their] isolation resulted a remarkable deficit of knowledge about the EU … It is 
therefore appropriate to enable the Turkish-Cypriots ... to develop fruitful relations with 
other EU Member States (Council of the European Union 2006, Article 1.1). 
 
Although the locals’ unfamiliarity with EU practices has resulted in waves of frustration with 
what is seen as a time-consuming process of grant applications,
14
 the promotion of youth 
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exchanges and people-to-people contacts is a good example of how the EU assisted local 
organisations, who were the main beneficiaries via awarded project such as participation in 
international festivals or study visits to the EU. The first call for proposals for the scheme in 
2007 was rather unsuccessful, and for the second call in 2009 the Commission devoted extra 
resources (European Commission 2009) in order to increase the capacity of the locals as far as 
preparing applications was concerned, which was considered weak and a reason for the bad 
results of the first round (European Commission 2009). Indeed, more than 85 per cent of the 
second call grants were successfully claimed, offering evidence as to how the EU has 
increased the technical capacity and professionalism of local civil society. In this regard, low 
external sovereignty and the resulting isolation not only facilitated an EU-informed 
empowered civil society (mechanism number 2) with more opportunities for links abroad but 
the technical assistance towards preparing funding bids became an avenue for the 
communication of new ideas and practises (mechanism number 3). However and as discussed 
before, the long-term sustainability of this impact in such an unstable country is questionable. 
 
The EU in Palestine 
The reasons for the contested statehood of Palestine can be traced back to the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the subsequent British withdrawal from these territories. In Resolution 
181, the UN decided upon the division of Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish, and the 
internationalisation of Jerusalem. In the aftermath of the 1967 War, Israel occupied the West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza and the Golan Heights. On 15 November 1988, Yasser 
Arafat, President of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, proclaimed the State of Palestine 
based on UN Resolution 181. In 2012, the UN decided to upgrade Palestine from ‘non-
member observer entity’ to ‘non-member observer state’ with a majority of 138 states voting 
in favour. The upgrade reconfirmed that Palestinians enjoy a certain degree of ‘titular’ 
recognition. Linked to the fact that 137 states already recognise Palestine, it enjoys a higher 
degree of external sovereignty compared to the TRNC. Conversely, it is the lack of internal 
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sovereignty, in the form of weaker state structures and control over the territory that the 
Palestinians claim, which mainly defines Palestine and is explored in relation to the process of 
Europeanisation here. 
 
As mentioned above, the 1993 Oslo Accords created a number of non-contiguous population 
centres and areas upon which the PA did not have full control. Coupled with the fact that no 
formal institutions existed before Oslo, entrenched the low degree of internal sovereignty of 
Palestine although, at the same time, this also provided the EU with state-building 
opportunities. The EU provided half the funding needed for the setting up of the PA’s 
institutions following the 1993 Oslo Accords because it was hoped that building Palestinian 
institutions would be a first step towards the establishment of a Palestinian state and the end 
of the conflict (Le More 2005, 27; Bouris 2014, 73). The EU was also involved in the 
complex structure that was created in 1993-1994 to coordinate aid in Palestine and the 12 
working groups, replaced by four Strategy Groups in 2005, which target different aspects of 
state-building such as economy, governance, infrastructure and social development. As such, 
the EU and its member states have been directly involved in every aspect of the state-building 
project conducted in Palestine, including the establishment of the PA’s government’s 
institutions and structures such as ministries and public administration.  
 
This involvement unleashed Europeanisation pressures because, through its engagement, the 
EU has been able to impact the institutional development of Palestine via compliance with 
institutional directions as well as through change of practices. The legal basis for this has been 
the Interim Association Agreement signed between the EU and the PLO, on behalf of the PA 
in 1997. The Action Plan, concluded in 2005 on the basis of this agreement, prioritised 
structural changes relating to PA institutions, including judicial and electoral reform, effective 
enforcement of legislation, open, fair and free elections, transparency of public finances and 
the restructure of civil service and security (EU-PA Action Plan 2005). These prescriptions 
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had a strong impact as they were mostly implemented on the ground by the Palestinians, who 
embarked on the requested domestic reforms, such as the holding of elections in 2006. 
Another example of EU-induced changes via specific institutional prescriptions (mechanism 
number 1) has been the pressure exerted on the Palestinian leadership in 2002 for the adoption 
and entry into force of the Basic Law, legislation on the independence of the judiciary and 
abolition of the State Security Courts. In 2003, EU pressure also resulted in the revision of the 
Palestinian Basic Law and the creation of a prime ministerial post. The rationale behind this 
was to curb the powers concentrated in the hands of Palestinian President Arafat and this 
impacted not only on the new institutional design but also on the distribution of political 
power.   
 
Because of contested statehood conditions, and particularly owing to the low degree of 
internal sovereignty and the lack of well-functioning core state institutions (such as, for 
example, security institutions), the EU deployed two civilian missions in Palestine in order to 
help the PA reform its security sector. The first, EUBAM Rafah, was deployed in 2005 at 
Rafah Crossing Point in order to a) assist the PA to build capacity on border management and 
customs, b) evaluate the PA’s application of the procedures, c) contribute to confidence 
building between Israel and the PA, d) ensure effective border control and, finally, e) 
contribute to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and Egyptian authorities in all aspects 
of border management at Rafah (Council of the European Union 2005a). The second mission, 
EUPOL COPPS, provides training, advice and equipment to the Palestinian Civil Police 
(PCP) and also works closely with Palestinian institutions such as the ministries of justice and 
interior. Officials of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the Political and 
Security Community responsible for EUPOL COPPS underline how they have assisted the 
drafting of the Code of Conduct on the Use of Force and Firearms (already entered into force) 
and helped the relevant ministries with drafting the Police Law and the Criminal Procedure 
Law.
15
 In this regard, the development of EUPOL COPPS has triggered the socialisation of 
 17 
the PCP officers and civil servants into certain practices and styles as well as ‘ways of doing 
things’ (see mechanism number 3). The missions have also had an impact on the 
strengthening of internal organisation capacities and staff skills. As an official from the PCP 
states: ‘We now have the ability to train our people and our own policemen and all this thanks 
to the EU’.16 
 
Yet, contested statehood conditions and the lack of Palestinian control over the territories they 
claim (linked to Israel’s control of those areas) have had rather negative implications for the 
operationalisation of both missions on the ground and the impact that the EU has exerted. In 
the case of EUBAM Rafah, for example, Israel had the upper hand on whether the European 
monitors would be permitted to reach Rafah and, consequently, whether the border crossing 
would be open or not. Israel also had the ultimate control of the rest of the crossing points in 
and out of Gaza. Similarly, EUPOL COPPS also faced limitations because its staff can be 
present only where the Palestinian police are permitted to operate and this decision is taken by 
the Israeli Defense Forces. The deployment of both missions on the ground allowed the EU to 
have a say and impact on two of the ‘final status’ issues (security and borders) affecting the 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bouris 2012, 262); but, at the same, the missions’ 
operationalisation, and the related potential for Europeanisation, has directly been affected 
because of the realities of the Israeli occupation and Palestine’s lack of internal sovereignty. 
Because of the restrictions imposed by Israel (see above), a range of training or running of 
broader projects on border management, human rights, customs and capacity building could 
not take place.  
 
Like the TRNC, the Palestinian contested state suffers from a broader underdevelopment, 
which goes beyond state institutions and touches upon the economy and infrastructure. 
However, in this case, this is more a result of the low degree of internal sovereignty. Because 
the lack of territorial control and developed state institutions new opportunities for 
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Europeanisation exist, not only in the domains of institutional changes but also in 
development policies. Palestine is the second biggest recipient of EU development aid after 
Turkey and has received more than €6 billion since 1994 (European Commission 2013). 
Between 1994 and 1998, 40 per cent of European money was channelled into construction, 
infrastructure and institution building (European Commission 2013, 88).  
 
At the same time, the low degree of internal sovereignty, manifested in the deficit of 
Palestinian control over the territories they claim, severely limited the impact of the EU in 
implementing its development projects in Palestine. The division of the West Bank, in areas 
A, B and C, has meant that the EU could take initiatives and implement its projects mainly in 
Area A, whereas for projects in areas B and C, prior approval had to be given by Israel. As a 
result, the EU and the PA were allowed to plan development projects only in one per cent of 
Area C, which is a stark example of economic disablement. But even in cases where such an 
approval was given, Israel would still decide over the future fate of these projects. In March 
2012, for example, Stefan Füle presented a list of 82 EU-funded projects worth almost €30 
million, which were destroyed by Israel from the burst of the second intifada (2000) until 
2011. More recently, and as a response to the EU’s decision to prohibit the awarding of EU 
grants, loans or prizes to Israeli entities based in the occupied Palestinian territories, the 
Israeli Minister of Defence instructed Coordination of Government Activities in the 
Territories to cease joint projects with the EU (Sherwood 2013). To this end, the realities on 
the ground make it extremely difficult both for the PA and the EU to reliably plan and 
implement economic development measures – and this also limits the engagement and impact 
of the EU. 
 
A more political EU-induced redistribution of power has also taken place, which favours 
elites and actors that are perceived as supportive of a compromised solution to the conflict 
(mechanism number 2). In 2006, following Hamas’ electoral victory, the EU decided to freeze 
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its direct aid by establishing a Temporary International Mechanism, which would channel 
money directly to people and projects, bypassing the Hamas-led government. This 
reallocation of resources signalled an EU-informed loss of power for Hamas. Further and 
since 2007, the EU has engaged only with the Fatah-led West Bank government, which has 
been perceived as being in favour of negotiations and peace with Israel. The low degree of 
internal sovereignty had an impact on this EU-induced redistribution of power: the fact that 
the constituting territorial parts (the West Bank and Gaza) of what is called Palestine are 
physically disconnected has facilitated the EU’s engagement and empowerment of the Fatah-
led West Bank while Gaza has remained under political but also physical isolation.  
 
Opportunities and limitations for the EU in contested states 
Different parameters of contested statehood in northern Cyprus and Palestine have shaped the 
role and impact of the EU, providing important examples for Europeanisation in contested 
states. Testing our intervening variable of lac of international recognition in the TRNC, we 
found that inability of the EU to engage with the authorities of a contested state that suffers 
limited external sovereignty has not allowed the realisation of the full potential of its aims. At 
the same time, the international isolation which comes with lack of recognition is also 
responsible for the low absorption capacity of Turkish Cypriots, which also creates further 
complications, such as delays in projects or extraordinary needs for supervision. Based on 
this, a series of questions emerge for the wider future debate on the EU. For example, what 
does this compromised engagement mean for the resolution of the related conflict? Recently 
in TRNC, the failure of the EU to fulfil its promises has damaged its credibility and ability to 
mobilise people towards resolution of the dispute, like what happened during the Annan Plan 
in 2004. Having said that, the on-going isolation of the TRNC might still be an incentive for 
locals to support a reunification plan again, as their only way out to full international 
existence as parts of a reunified Cyprus. Also, does the realisation that political uncertainty 
compromises EU engagement lead to greater efforts for resolving the conflict? Finally, this 
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paper has suggested that the EU’s engagement in contested states is difficult because of the 
lack of international recognition, but, given the different degrees of external sovereignty that 
exist across contested states, are there any variations in this difficulty? Are there, for example, 
contested states where there is more room for engagement and/or influence compared to 
others and, if yes, why?  
 
We can answer some of these questions by comparing northern Cyprus to Palestine, which 
differ as far international recognition is concerned. Indeed, a greater external sovereignty in 
the case of Palestine has meant a much heavier EU involvement. This, however, is not to 
underestimate the challenges that in this case stem from the low degree of internal sovereignty 
and ineffective state structures and authority over parts of the self-declared territory, which 
we tested separately as different intervening variables. Low internal sovereignty has limited 
the ability of the EU to promote its goals in those areas. The territorial fragmentation of 
territories controlled by the PA and the simultaneous Israeli control of the most part of self-
declared territories of the contested state mean that almost everything has to be approved by 
Israel first, which has long remained the final arbiter of both the EU initiatives but also of 
Palestinian life. This has been the case with the two EU civilian missions as well as the EU-
funded development and infrastructure projects. Ultimately, this compromises the chances of 
a successful two-state solution. With many contested states facing challenges in fully 
controlling their declared territories, our analysis can inform more research on the EU’s 
ability to engage and how this is limited by the lack of internal sovereignty. 
 
At the same time, however, the unique parameters of contested statehood also offer several 
opportunities for the role and impact of the EU. In both cases, the EU had the opportunity to 
address underdevelopment, which comes as a result of contested statehood. In northern 
Cyprus, the low degree of external sovereignty has resulted in years of international isolation 
and a considerable gap between what the EU would like to foster and what exists locally, 
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where institutions and policies are acquis incompatible and people remain unfamiliar with 
EU-promoted policies and practices. This gap has increased Europeanisation pressures upon 
Turkish Cypriot policies and institutions – through technical and financial assistance – and 
here, Europeanisation takes place via the change of practices (mechanism number 3) towards 
development and preparation for EU law implementation. The role of the EU (and therefore 
the extent of Europeanisation) has not fully materialised because of the challenging 
diplomatic context of contested statehood, but this is not to undermine the EU-induced 
changes explained so far or the potential for further Europeanisation. Palestine presents a 
similar story, although it is the limited internal sovereignty that mediates EU engagement and 
Europeanisation. Here, weak state structures provide room for the Europeanisation of 
institutions and policies through state-building and, ultimately, the strengthening of internal 
sovereignty (at least when it comes to institutions). Yet, despite the fact that the international 
community in 2011 praised the improvement and functioning of Palestinian institutions (e.g. 
International Monetary Fund 2011, 66; World Bank 2010, 5; UN 2011, 1), progress has not 
been linear
17
 and has faced severe limitations because of Israel’s policies as well as due to the 
inability of the Palestinians to fully control their territories. Despite these limitations, when 
we look at both cases in comparison it is clear that the misfit between the domestic status quo 
and what the EU would like to promote, facilitates a certain process of Europeanisation, both 
through changing ideas and practices (mechanism number 3) as well institutional or policy 
compliance (in the case of Palestine, mechanism number 1). Assisting the development of 
contested states might create a short-term intransigence on the ‘other side’ (here, the Greek 
Cypriots and Israel) but has potential for the longer-term chances for peace. In Cyprus, for 
example, narrowing the gap that exists between the developed south and the relatively 
underdeveloped north is crucial for a smooth implementation of a federal agreement. 
Similarly, state-building initiatives in Palestine have been used as a conflict resolution tool, 
which could eventually help the implementation of a two-state solution. 
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Beyond development, the lack of internal or external sovereignty offers further opportunities 
for Europeanisation. In the TRNC, the low degree of external sovereignty has enabled the EU 
to help individuals and civil society to participate more in international processes. The non-
recognition of the TRNC has added to the prioritisation of non-state actors instead of 
authorities from the contested state, which become diplomatically risky interlocutors. This has 
meant two things for Europeanisation: first, promotion of unique institutional solutions, 
whereby public authorities are replaced by technocrats or civil society; and, second, the 
consequent empowerment of those actors, particularly those that were able to capitalise in 
their already strong capacity, like the KKTO (mechanism number 2). These are important 
insights and contribute to the existing literature, which has mostly focused on how the 
international community engages with civil society in similar conflicts because of its 
important role in reconciliation (e.g. Caspersen and Herrberg 2010, Berg and Pegg 2016). 
Yet, this paper looked at civil society beyond reconciliation strictly speaking and added 
details with regard to the specificities of contested statehood and the role of the EU. These 
new findings need to be combined with existing knowledge on civil society and reconciliation 
in order to reflect on how this process of Europeanisation might impact conflict resolution. In 
Cyprus, civil society continues to promote reconciliation but this does not seem to be a result 
of EU assistance. Indeed, EU officials have explained that they viewed the dominance of 
reconciliation agenda in civil society organisations as an unhealthy sign of over-politicisation, 
which they tried to mend by funding organisations with different aims
18
. Consequently, the 
relation between civil society promotion and reconciliation in contested states in particular 
should be problematised more systematically. At the same time, EU processes and actors also 
need to be examined in more detail. While this study has offered evidence that there exist 
opportunities for the international integration of locals from contested states, whether certain 
European processes or institutions are more open to contested states is a question that needs 
further investigation. 
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What is also noteworthy is that the case of Palestine seems to be the opposite of the TRNC as 
far as state institutions are concerned: while the low degree of external sovereignty results in 
EU avoidance of state institutions in northern Cyprus, the low degree of internal sovereignty 
leads to engagement with and assistance of state institutions in Palestine. This is also because 
Palestine enjoys greater external sovereignty in comparison to the TRNC. The main objective 
is to help Palestine address the absence of an effective state apparatus and to build a state 
which would eventually contribute to the resolution of the conflict. EU assistance might have 
allowed Palestine to move up the sovereignty ‘ladder’ as far as effective governance is 
concerned, however ongoing problems of territorial control mean that Palestine continues to 
display low internal sovereignty. This seems to suggest that while governance incapacity 
offers opportunities for Europeanisation, the other aspect of limited internal sovereignty, that 
is ineffective territorial control, limits EU engagement.  
 
Conclusions 
Preoccupied with conventional states, the European studies literature has neglected contested 
states. This article has addressed this gap in the literature, through a comparative discussion 
that analysed how the lack of international recognition, territorial control and effective 
government in contested states mediate the engagement and impact of the EU. Our findings- a 
major empirical contribution in their own- make clear that parameters of contested statehood 
compromise the involvement of the EU because of its inability to deal with contested state 
authorities and/or engage in territories that are under the control of the parent/ reference state 
rather than the contested state. At the same time, however, there exist unique opportunities for 
the EU to make an impact, especially through the assistance of state-building and broader 
development, as well as international integration. These findings and the proposed conceptual 
framework from which they emanate are important for understanding the ability of the EU to 
exert an influence beyond traditional intergovernmental contexts and promote security and 
reconciliation. Yet, with conflict resolution being the ultimate aim of the EU and other 
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international actors in most contested states, this study aspires to encourage more research on 
the links between international engagement, contested statehood and the promotion of 
security and reconciliation. 
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